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COMMENTS
A VALIDATION OF PRETEXTUAL
ARRESTS: UNITED STATES v. TRIGG
In order to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the fourth amendment1 requires that law enforcement
agents obtain a warrant based upon probable cause before effecting
a search or seizure.2 When law enforcement officials fail to comply
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
2 See 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3.1(a) (2d ed. 1987). The founding fathers enacted the fourth amendment to protect
Americans from the unreasonable governmental intrusions that English citizens had suf-
fered at the hands of their government. J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 1-3
(1979). Upon the issuance of a general warrant, English officers were authorized to search
and seize books of a libelous nature and to arrest the suspected author. E. FISHER, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE 2-3 (1970). These general warrants, or "writs of assistance," were used to sanc-
tion the invasion of the colonists' privacy. R. DAvis, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 4
(1964). These writs of assistance were one of the main grievances which led to the American
Revolution. E. FISHER, supra, at 1 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)).
At times, the rights of the individual come into conflict with the efforts of law enforce-
ment. See M. ZARR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE POLICE 1 (1980). This is reflected in the
Bill of Rights, which "struck a balance which protected fundamental incidents of liberty,
while at the same time protecting public law and order and the citizen's security." Id. at 2;
see also Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation
in Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REv. 223, 226-27 (1983) (balances
fourth amendment warrant requirements with needs of police and individual). "[T]here can
be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967).
In United States v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception.... Requiring anymore would
unduly hamper law enforcement." Id. at 176. "To allow less would be to leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officer's whim or caprice." Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2:335
with this requirement, the usual remedy is to suppress, under the
exclusionary rule, all the evidence obtained as a result of that
search and seizure.' In the interests of safety and effective law en-
To determine probable cause, the Court avoided adopting a balancing test that would
be so complicated it could not be applied consistently. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra, § 3.2(a), at
558. This was recognized by the Court in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), where
the Court refused to implement a proposed multifactor "balancing test." Id. at 211-12. The
Court feared that such a test would nullify the fourth amendment's protection. See id. at
213.
The fourth amendment employs a reasonableness standard since "many situations
which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous,
[and] room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
"But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability." Id. The Supreme Court has applied the same probable cause
standard to both arrests and searches. I W. LAFAvE, supra, § 3.1(b), at 544. However, this
does not mean the particular grounds justifying a search will justify an arrest, or vice versa,
as "[e]ach requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circum-
stances." Id.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that searches pursuant to a warrant are to be
preferred over warrantless searches. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106
(1965). Thus, whether probable cause exists is usually determined by a magistrate. See Han-
cock, State Court Activism and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 VA. L. REV. 1085, 1093
(1982). The Court in Ventresca stated that warrantless searches condemned by the Court
often would have been held valid had the officers obtained a warrant from a magistrate,
even if based upon the same evidence. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106. Warrants may be
obtained by officers electronically, via telephone or radio, to limit the need for an arrest
without a warrant. See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1492 & n.111 (1985).
1 See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1.1(b), at 5. Unlike the fifth amendment, the fourth
amendment does not provide for sanctions against unlawful government actions. Id. As a
result, the exclusionary rule was designed to deter searches and seizures in violation of the
fourth amendment. Id. § 1.1(f), at 16. The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihis Court has.
. required ... a strict adherence to that ... constitutionally required ... deterrent safe-
guard without ... which the fourth amendment would have been reduced to 'a form of
words.'" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)). The courts use the rule to suppress evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (evidence
obtained in violation of fourth amendment inadmissible in state courts); Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (upheld suppression of evidence illegally obtained under state
warrant applying federal standards); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (pre-
vented use of evidence seized by federal agents in violation of fourth amendment); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886) (utilizing fourth and fifth amendments to sup-
press illegally obtained evidence).
The exclusionary rule has been one of the most controversial areas of constitutional law.
See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 1.2 (outlining attacks made on exclusionary rule); see also
B. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 45 (1986).
("There is nothing in the wording of the Fourth Amendment that explicitly commands, or
from which one can logically infer, that... evidence obtained in the course of [an] unlawful
act shall not be admitted in a criminal [process]"). But see Schrock & Welsh, Up From
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251,
366 (1974) (exclusionary rule is constitutionally protected individual right).
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forcement, the Supreme Court has fashioned a number of excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.' One exception, a search incident
to arrest,5 permits law enforcement agents to conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee to seize weapons and prevent the destruction
of evidence.' The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that
law enforcement officials should not abuse this exception through
pretextual arrests.7 A pretextual arrest occurs when a law enforce-
ment agent initiates a valid arrest in order to search for evidence
of an unrelated crime for which probable cause is lacking., Re-
cently, in United States v. Trigg,9 the Seventh Circuit held that a
search incident to an arrest was valid as long as the law enforce-
4 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (fourth amendment not ap-
plicable when prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his cell); Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (open field search not unreasonable under fourth amendment); Michi-
gan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978) (warrantless fire investigation reasonable under
fourth amendment); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (border searches
permissible without probable cause); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (warrant-
less search and seizure of felon in hot pursuit permissible); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
59 (1967) (warrantless search of automobile permissible on facts which would not justify
search of home).
" See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (police may search containers
found within defendant's control when conducting valid search incident to arrest); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on prob-
able cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being law-
ful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id.; see also Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1947) (evidence seized by FBI agents after five hour
search of defendant's entire apartment held valid as search incident to arrest).
I See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (where lawful arrest is made, "it
is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested... to remove any weap-
ons.., and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment
or destruction"); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (right to search persons
incident to a lawful arrest in order to seize evidence related to crime undoubted). However,
in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), while recognizing that the search incident
to arrest exception was based upon the need to protect officers and secure evidence, the
Court stated that the exception was a reasonable fourth amendment intrusion which re-
quired no additional justification. Id. at 235.
7 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) ("an arrest may not be used
as a pretext to search for evidence"); Comment, Pretext Searches and The Fourth Amend-
ment: Unconstitutional Abuses of Power, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1791, 1803 (1989) (arguing that
all pretextual arrests violate fourth amendment).
8 Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[a]n arrest ostensibly
for one purpose but in reality for the primary purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is un-
reasonable under the fourth . . . amendment[]"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989);
Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961) ("the search must be incident
to the arrest and not vice versa") (emphasis in original). See generally, Burkoff, Bad Faith
Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 100-19 (1982) (discussing different approaches to determin-
ing bad faith searches).
9 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989).
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ment agent had probable cause for the initial arrest and was legally
authorized to make a custodial arrest, irrespective of the agent's
pretextual motives.'"
On February 1, 1988, Officers Philip Bird and Dan Edenfield
of the Allen County (Indiana) Police Department arrested defend-
ant William Trigg on an outstanding body attachment." Officer
Bird ran a computer check which revealed that Trigg was driving
an automobile with a suspended license.'" Trigg was not informed
of the driving infraction and his license was returned. 3 On March
16, 1988, while investigating the town's known "crack houses," Of-
ficer Bird drove by Trigg's house and observed Trigg's vehicle in
the driveway.' 4 Due to the vehicle's "dubious history" (Bird
remembered having seen this vehicle parked in front of a known
"crack house"), Officer Bird placed it under surveillance.15 When
Trigg entered his vehicle and drove away, the police followed
him. 6 Officer Bird ran a second computer check, which revealed
that Trigg's license was still suspended." Officer Bird relayed this
information to Officer Royse, and Trigg was arrested for driving
with a suspended license.' Trigg was subjected to a pat-down
search where it was discovered that he was carrying fifty-three
grams of cocaine.19 The district court granted Trigg's motion to
suppress the cocaine, concluding that the traffic arrest was a pre-
text to search for narcotics.2 0 The government appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.2 '
10 Id. at 1041.
n Id. at 1038. The body attachment was issued because Trigg had failed to appear for
several court dates. Id. at 1038 n.1.
12 Id. at 1038. Officer Bird ran the computer check after Trigg was placed in lockup. Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. Officer Bird requested, and was granted permission, to begin the surveillance. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
1" Id. Officer Royse was asked to assist in stopping Trigg because Officer Bird, a narcot-
ics officer, normally would not make traffic arrests. Id. at 1038 n.2. Officer Royse claimed he
arrested Trigg because he was familiar with his history, and also because Trigg had at-
tempted to flee. Id. at 1038 n.3. The district court expressly rejected this second assertion.
Id.
" Id. at 1038. Trigg was indicted on one count of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Id.
"o Id. The district court relied on the fact that numerous narcotics officers participated
in the routine traffic arrest and that Officer Royse could have issued Trigg a traffic citation,
but declined to do so. Id. at 1038 & n.4.
21 Id. at 1038.
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Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Flaum noted that the
Supreme Court had not defined the term "pretextual arrest."22
The court, however, interpreted three recent Supreme Court cases
as dictating that an objective assessment of a police officer's ac-
tions was required when considering alleged fourth amendment vi-
olations.23 The court concluded that the validity of a search inci-
dent to arrest depended upon the existence of probable cause for
the initial arrest and authorization to effect a custodial arrest.2 4
The court, finding that the facts of this case satisfied these require-
ments, held that the arrest and subsequent search in question were
reasonable under the fourth amendment.25
In a concurring opinion, Judge Ripple asserted that the test
adopted by the majority was overly broad.26 Although agreeing
with the majority that recent Supreme Court decisions mandated
an objective analysis of police conduct, Judge Ripple argued that
the Supreme Court had not adopted the same "rigid position" as-
serted by the majority.27 He posited that, at times, police conduct
could rise to the level of gross abuse of authority in violation of the
fourth amendment.28 Judge Ripple, however, deterniined that no
such abuse existed in this case, since Trigg was properly arrested
because of his suspended license.29
By adopting an objective test, the Seventh Circuit maintained
that an allegedly pretextual arrest was reasonable under the fourth
amendment, due to the existence of probable cause for the initial
arrest.30 This Comment will suggest that the Seventh Circuit's
adoption of an objective test was premised upon an erroneous
analysis of the pertinent Supreme Court decisions. Further, this
Comment will assert that Supreme Court precedent supports the
utilization of subjective factors to determine whether a fourth
amendment violation has occurred. Finally, this Comment will pro-
22 Id. at 1039 ("Supreme Court's response to the problem of pretextual arrests has been
ambiguous").
23 Id. at 1040. The Trigg court relied primarily on Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,
470-71 (1985), United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983), and Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 131 (1978). See Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040.
24 Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1042 (Ripple, J., concurring).
2'7 Id. at 1042-43 (Ripple, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 1043 (Ripple, J., concurring).
29 Id. (Ripple, J., concurring).
-0 Id. at 1040-41.
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pose a more effective test to evaluate the reasonableness of a
pretextual arrest under the fourth amendment, combining both ob-
jective and subjective standards.
I. THE Trigg APPROACH: A PURELY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
The Trigg court began its analysis by acknowledging the prob-
lem of pretextual arrests.3 1 The court determined that the pretext
problem stemmed from three factors: (1) the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the search incident to arrest exception; (2) the exten-
sion of the search incident to arrest exception to all custodial ar-
rests; and (3) the admissibility of all evidence discovered during a
lawful search.3 2 These factors allow police officers to use lawful ar-
rests as a pretext for the investigation of unrelated crimes.33 While
the Trigg court had an opportunity to curb pretextual arrests, the
court failed to focus on the pretext issue; instead, it limited its in-
quiry to whether a pretextual arrest was reasonable under the
fourth amendment.3 4 Under the court's analysis, an arrest is rea-
sonable when the arresting officer has both probable cause for the
underlying arrest and the authority to make a custodial arrest.3 5 As
a result, the issue in Trigg was not the validity of a search incident
to arrest, but whether the initial arrest was a pretext which would
render the initial arrest and subsequent search unlawful s.3  The
Trigg standard, as Judge Ripple acknowledged, does not ade-
quately address the pretext problem. Under the Trigg standard,
" Id. at 1038-39. Judge Flaum stated that "[tihe subject of pretextual arrests presents
some of the most intriguing historical, conceptual and practical issues in the often problem-
atic area of fourth amendment jurisprudence." Id.
32 Id. at 1039.
31 See id.
" See id. at 1041.
35 See id. As Judge Flaum noted, "[tihis proposition may be stated another way: so
long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively author-
ized to do, an arrest is constitutional." Id.
11 See id. at 1037-38.
17 See id. at 1042 (Ripple, J., concurring). Judge Ripple stated that "the test formu-
lated today requires a rigidity that will, in future cases, ill serve what Chief Justice Rehn-
quist has termed 'the overarching principle of 'reasonableness' embodied in the fourth
amendment.'" Id. In expounding on the Seventh Circuit's stance on pretextual arrests,
Judge Will, in United States v. Kordosky, 878 F.2d 991 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 110 S.Ct. 1943 (1990), stated that "the [Seventh] Circuit, rightly or
wrongly, has determined that any basis for a valid arrest justifies a search regardless of
motive or how pretexual the arrest is." Id. at 955 (Will, J., concurring). Judge Will also
noted that the Seventh Circuit's "objective" test is "clearly inconsistent" with United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932). Kordosky, 878 F.2d at 955 (Will, J., concurring).
(Vol. 64:2:335
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police officers will easily be able to circumvent the pretextual ar-
rest restriction. For example, to search an individual suspected of
narcotics activity where probable cause is lacking, an officer could
place the individual's vehicle under surveillance.38 If a traffic viola-
tion occurs during the surveillance, the police officer could then
arrest the individual and search for evidence of an unrelated
crime.39 Such an arrest is pretextual, and yet valid, since the police
officer had probable cause for the underlying traffic violation and
authority to make a custodial arrest. In effect, the Seventh Circuit,
by adopting an objective approach, has validated pretextual
Further, he concluded that if the case was one of first impression, he would hold the arrest
and subsequent search invalid, but the Seventh Circuit's adoption of this standard man-
dated his concurrence. Id. (Will, J., concurring)
" See United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 711 (11th Cir. 1986). The Smith court
stated that if they abandoned their reasonable officer test, and adopted a narrow Trigg-type
objective test, "police officers could easily make the random, arbitrary stops denounced in
Terry." Id. "With little more than an inarticulate 'hunch' of illegal activity an officer could
begin following a vehicle and then stop it for the slightest deviation from a completely
steady course." Id. Most scenarios dealing with pretextual arrests involve minor traffic viola-
tions as the initial offense. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, § 5.2(e), at 457. Since very few
drivers can manage to avoid some traffic violation when driving for any appreciable dis-
tance, "[lt is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures out onto the public streets and
highways may then, with little effort by the police, be placed in a position where he is sub-
ject to a full search." Id. at 458.
11 See Smith, 799 F.2d at 711. "[I]t is clear that this subterfuge is employed as a means
for searching for evidence on the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully arrested for
the crimes of which they are suspected." See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 5.2(e), at 458.
Professor LaFave described the potential for pretextual abuse as "frightening," leading him
to conclude that the Supreme Court must formulate a rule to govern police practice to pro-
tect against pretextual arrests. Id. This sentiment is also shared by Professor John Burkoff.
See Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DEW. L. REV.
363, 389-91 (1989). According to Professor Burkoff, the purely objective test "is a very dan-
gerous position to take." Id. at 389. If such "[a] narrow view of pretext were to prevail,
anyone who has an outstanding parking or traffic 'warrant' could be arrested at any time
because the police wanted to investigate any other offense." Id. (emphasis in original). "It
should not be difficult to convince the Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the fact that
even ordinarily law-abiding citizens occasionally receive [traffic) tickets." Id. at 390 n.123
(citing Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 10, col. 1). As
a result of this approach "[t]he fourth amendment's requirement of probable cause would,
in essence, be nullified." See Burkoff, supra, at 389.
A similar opinion was expressed by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Guzman, 864
F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988). The Guzman court noted:
an objective test that asks no more than whether some set of facts might justify a
given stop would permit arbitrary intrusions in situations such as traffic stops.
Under such a test, thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic regula-
tions would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom to stop.
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arrests.40
II. SUBJECTIVE INTENT APPROACH
A subjective pretext analysis seeks to determine the motiva-
tion of the arresting law enforcement officer.4' When the arresting
officer's primary purpose is to uncover evidence of an unrelated
crime for which probable cause is lacking, the arrest is invalid.42
The Trigg court itself conceded that a subjective analysis is the
most effective method of determining whether an arrest is pretex-
tual.43 Nevertheless, the court opined that the Supreme Court had
mandated that only objective factors be considered when address-
ing fourth amendment issues. 44 However, the Trigg court itself ad-
'0 See supra note 39 & accompanying text; see also Kordosky, 878 F.2d at 995 (Will, J.,
concurring) ("this circuit, rightly or wrongly, has determined that any basis for a valid ar-
rest justifies a search regardless of ... how pretextual the arrest is").
"' See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 2431 (1989); United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986).
42 See Warren, 816 F.2d at 1257; State v. Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 262-63 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc), cert. dismissed, 480 U.S. 698 (1987).
"I See Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040. The Trigg court stated that "the adoption of an objec-
tive standard substantially diminishes the chances of discovering pretextual arrests." Id.
Many courts continue to apply a subjective standard. See Warren, 816 F.2d at 1257 ("[w]ere
the use of misdemeanor arrest warrants as a pretext for searching people suspected of felo-
nies to be permitted, a mockery could be made of the Fourth Amendment and its guaran-
tees." (quoting Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961)); Smith, 802
F.2d at 1124 (whether arrest is pretextual turns on motivation of arresting officer).
Many state courts also continue to make an inquiry into the law enforcement agent's
motivation for the arrest. See Folly v. State, 28 Ark. App. 98, 103, 771 S.W.2d 306, 309
(1989) (en banc) ("where the search and not the arrest is the officer's true objective, the
search is not a reasonable one"); People v. Sawczenko, 180 Ill. App. 3d 406, 409-10, 535
N.E.2d 1105, 1108 (1st Dist.); appeal denied, 126 I1. 2d. 565, 541 N.E. 2d 1113 (1989): Blair,
691 S.W.2d at 264; Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240, 244-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
In Blair, when the state asked the court not to inquire into the motives of the arresting
officers due to recent Supreme Court decisions, the court replied "if the recent pronounce-
ments of the United States Supreme Court have any applicability to the instant appeal, it is
in their acknowledgment that courts can and will consider the question of good faith, or lack
thereof, on the part of the police." Blair, 691 S.W.2d at 264.
" Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1040. The Trigg court cited three Supreme Court cases in deter-
mining that an objective analysis of the pretextual problem was required. See id. First, in
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985), the Supreme Court stated that the purchase of
obscene magazines by an undercover police officer was not a seizure, but a bona fide
purchase, and that "[t]he sale is not retrospectively transformed into a warrantless seizure
by virtue of the officer's subjective intent to retrieve the purchase money to use as evi-
dence." Id. at 471.
The second case, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), involved a
patrol by customs officers, accompanied by Louisiana State Policemen. Id. at 582. The of-
ficers boarded the defendant's vessel to conduct a document check. Id. at 583. While on
board, one of the officers smelled what he thought was burning marijuana. Id. He then ob-
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mitted, the case law it relied on in its opinion are not directly on
point.45 Moreover, in Colorado v. Bertine,8 a 1987 Supreme Court
decision, the Court applied a subjective test when confronted with
an alleged fourth amendment violation.47 Specifically, the Court
examined the motivation of a police officer who had conducted a
search of several sealed containers.48 The Court held that the
search was reasonable because there had been no showing that the
police officer had "acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of
investigation."4  If the police officer's actions were in bad faith, the
defendant's fourth amendment rights would have been violated
served burlap sacks in plain view which proved to contain marijuana. Id. The Supreme
Court upheld the defendant's conviction, because "[tihe nature of the governmental interest
in assuring compliance with documentation requirements, particularly in waters where the
need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great, is substantial; the type of intrusion made in
this case, while not minimal, is limited." Id. at 593.
And in the third case, United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), defendants moved to
suppress telephone conversations intercepted by government agents. Id. at 132. The district
court suppressed the calls, reasoning that the indiscriminate behavior of the agents was
unreasonable. Id. at 131. Upholding the circuit court's reversal, the Supreme Court stated
that "almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment
the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances then known to him." Id. at 137.
Of these three cases, Villamonte-Marquez dealt with the pretext question most di-
rectly. See Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. The Court, quoting United States v.
Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1980), affirmed that "[w]e would see little logic in sanction-
ing such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of
suspected smugglers." Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. Consistent with Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, Arra involved a document check of a vessel by federal agents who are
statutorily authorized to board any vessel at any time, even without the suspicion of any
wrongdoing. Arra, 630 F.2d at 839. The Supreme Court, however, made an important dis-
tinction between stops of vessels at sea, and cars on highways: "It seems clear that if the
customs officers in this case had stopped an automobile on a public highway near the bor-
der, rather than a vessel in a ship channel, the stop would have run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment because of the absence of articulable suspicion." Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.
at 588. It is asserted that the Trigg court erred in its application of this case to its own facts,
since the police had no articulable suspicion to stop Trigg for narcotics possession. See
Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1038.
'- Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1039; 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 2, § 5.2(e), at 458. "[T]he Supreme
Court has never directly confronted the issue of pretextual arrests." Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1039;
see also United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.) ("[w]e have found no direct
Supreme Court authority on this issue"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987).
46 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
47 Id. at 372.
41 Id. at 373. The Court also utilized a subjective test in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S.
79, 85 (1987). The Garrison Court held that the search would have been invalid "if the
officers had known [that the warrant was overbroad]." Id. (emphasis added).
'9 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
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and the search found invalid.50 It is submitted that this same sub-
jective standard should be applied when determining if an arrest
was in fact pretextual.
III. REASONABLE OFFICER TEST
Most courts that have rejected a subjective intent approach
have implemented a "reasonable officer" test.51 Under the reasona-
ble officer test, the court makes an objective assessment of the of-
ficer's conduct in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
him at the time of the arrest.52 An arrest, according to this test,
would not be invalid because the arresting officer was motivated by
the hope of finding evidence of an unrelated offense; rather, it
would be invalid if a reasonable officer would not have made the
arrest without the additional motive." In other words, in deter-
mining whether an arrest is pretextual, the proper inquiry is not
whether the arresting officer could validly have made the investiga-
tory stop, but whether a reasonable officer would have made the
50 See id.
" Compare United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (expressly
adopted Smith reasonable officer test); United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 869, 871 (11th Cir.
1988) (to determine if stop is pretext, ask whether reasonable officer would have made stop
in absence of ulterior motivation) (following United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th
Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 866 (1989); and United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,
215 (3d Cir.) (stop was objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833 (1987) with
United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d Cir.) (valid search not rendered invalid
by fact police resorted to pretext to continue search and detention), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
957 (1987).
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied,
110 S.Ct. 1946 (1990), stated that a reasonable objective test should be applied to both
inventory searches and pretext arrests. Id. at 1146 & n.3. The Judge court, examining the
reasonableness of a container search, followed Bertine: "[s]pecifically, we must ask whether
the agents' actions, when viewed from an objective standpoint, can reasonably be said to
have an administrative or safety motivation, as opposed to an evidentiary one." Id. at 1146.
The court stated that this test was analogous to the analysis used to determine if an arrest
was pretextual. Id. at 1146 n.3. Ultimately, the court held that "if an objective observer
would conclude that the only legitimate purpose for opening a container found in a vehicle
could have been to find evidence, the opening of the container was an illegal search." Id. at
1146 (emphasis added).
Most state courts also apply a reasonable officer test. See, e.g., Kehoe v. State, 521 So.
2d 1094, 1096 (Fla. 1988) (followed Smith reasonable officer test); People v. Howard, 162
Cal. App. 3d 8, 14, 208 Cal. Rptr. 353, 357 (1984) ("reasonableness of the search becomes
critical") (emphasis in original). But see supra note 43 (examples of states that apply sub-
jective standard).
See Hawkins, 811 F.2d at 214; Smith, 799 F.2d at 709.
See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518; Smith, 799 F.2d at 710.
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stop under the same conditions without the improper motive.54
IV. DUAL SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE TEST
The precedent for a dual subjective-objective test emanated
from the Supreme Court's holding in Colorado v. Bertine.5 In Ber-
tine, the Court analyzed the actions of a Colorado police officer
both objectively and subjectively. 6 It is asserted that a similar
test, combining both the subjective intent approach and the rea-
sonable officer test applied to pretextual arrests, would be the most
effective standard in evaluating pretextual arrests.
In determining if an arrest was pretextual, it is essential to
ascertain the police officer's motivation for the arrest. As a practi-
cal matter, however, such a determination is almost impossible.57
Few police officers can be expected to testify that their motives
were improper, especially since such testimony would result in the
suppression of evidence.58 This problem, however, could be averted
by utilizing the reasonable officer test in concert with a subjective
test, since the reasonable officer test is not concerned with an of-
ficer's motivation for acting unreasonably, only that he did act un-
reasonably.59 A court, however, should not rely solely on the rea-
sonable officer test either since this test may incorrectly validate a
pretextual arrest when the facts justify the arrest,60 despite the
54 See Smith, 799 F.2d at 711.
55 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987).
"I See id. The Court also appears to have adopted a subjective-objective test in Mary-
land v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) (search would be invalid "if the officers had known,
or even if they should have known [that the warrant was overbroad]") (emphasis added).
W7 See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516. The Guzman court stated that an inquiry into an
officer's motivation would be unproductive. See id.; see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 436-37 (1974) (subjective inquiry into police
officer's motivation in making arrest would fail since proper motivation "can be fabricated
all too easily and undetectably").
"I See Burkoff, supra note 39, at 377 ("[o]nly the use of a subjective pretext test serves
to deter those police officers who have no intention of following the law, but are nonetheless
'savvy' enough to make their conduct appear (objectively) as if it is lawful") (emphasis in
original); Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 437. "Motivation is. .. a self-generating phenome-
non; if a purpose to search for heroin can legally be accomplished only when accompanied
by a purpose to search for a weapon, knowledgeable officers will seldom experience the first
desire without a simultaneous onrush of the second." Id.
"' See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517.
11 See United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 833
(1987). "[D]espite the courts' general disapproval of police officers' resort to pretext, the
outcome of suppression motions has generally depended on objective factors." Id.
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fact that the initial arrest was admittedly a pretext." If the reason-
able officer test complemented the subjective test, unfair uses of
pretext would be avoided. 2
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Trigg, the Seventh Circuit determined
that a search incident to arrest will always be valid where the ini-
tial arrest was based on probable cause and the arresting officer
was authorized to make the subsequent custodial arrest. By choos-
ing this objective standard over a subjective or reasonable officer
standard, the court has essentially eliminated the possibility of
proving that an arrest was pretextual. This Comment has sug-
gested that a subjective analysis of the arresting officer's motiva-
tion, coupled with the reasonable officer test, would prevent unjust
circumvention of the fourth amendment warrant requirement. It
seems clear, on the other hand, that the standard adopted by the
Seventh Circuit will not adequately protect an individual's fourth
amendment rights.
John W. Barker
e' See id. ("We conclude that the fact that a pretext was given does not render invalid
an otherwise constitutional search").
2 See Warren v. City of Lincoln, 816 F.2d 1254, 1258 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 2431 (1989); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 711 (11th Cir. 1986) (subjective
test would declare arrests with ulterior purposes invalid).
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